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a b s t r a c t
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Dis-
abilities (CRPD) entered into force in May 2008. It is the ﬁrst
legally binding international treaty aimed speciﬁcally at protect-
ing the rights of persons with disabilities. Ratifying State Parties
have to either incorporate new laws or change existing laws,
to meet their obligations of implementing the CRPD. Article 12
(Equal Recognition before the Law) of the CRPD supports legal
capacity (recognition of a person’s right to make decisions). It
has been claimed that ‘it challenges literally centuries of legal
practice which may now be directly contrary to Article 12 and
therefore requires examination by States to ensure that legisla-
tion complies with the Convention. . .’ (McLay, 2008). In relation
to the interpretation of Article 12, most jurisdictions have incorpo-
rated substitute decision-making (e.g., guardianship) rather than
supported decision-making in their legislation. The best interpre-
tation of Article 12 requires a supported decision-making model.
This paper will illustrate this point by (a) examining different
approaches to legal capacity, (b) clarifying the distinction between
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substituted and supported decision-making, (c) examining the
history of Article 12 in light of substituted and supported decision-
making, and (d) arguing on the basis of history and the deliberation
process of the CRPD, that Article 12 requires state parties to imple-
ment supported decision-making.
© 2011 Association ALTER. Published by Elsevier Masson SAS.
All rights reserved.
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r é s u m é
La Convention des Nations Unies relative aux droits des personnes
handicapées (CRPD) est entrée en vigueur en mai 2008. En tant que
premier traité ayant une force légale internationalement reconnue,
elle concerne la protection des droits des personnes handicapées.
Les États membres qui l’ont ratiﬁée ou bien ont promulgué de nou-
velles lois ou bien ont changé les lois existantes aﬁn de souscrire
à leur engagement d’appliquer la CRPD. L’article 12 (reconnais-
sance des conditions d’égalité devant la loi) de la CRPD soutient la
notion de capacité légale (reconnaissance du droit d’une personne
à prendre des décisions). On a pu afﬁrmer qu’ il «met littérale-
ment enquestiondes siècles d’exercice législatif qui estmaintenant
directement contraire à l’article 12et qui nécessite donc un réexa-
men par les États pour assurer que la législation soit conforme à la
Convention. . . » (McLay, 2008). Pour l’interprétation de l’article 12,
la plupart des juridictions ont intégré dans leur législation la notion
de décision substituée (e.g., tutelle ou curateur public) plutôt que
celle de la décision accompagnée. Or, la meilleure interprétation
de l’article 12demande de suivre le modèle de la décision accom-
pagnée. Cet article soutient ce point de vue : (a) en examinant les
différentes déﬁnitions de la capacité légale, (b) en clariﬁant la dis-
tinction entre la décision substituée et la décision accompagnée,
(c) en examinant l’histoire de l’article 12 sur la décision substi-
tuée et la décision accompagnée, (d) en argumentant sur la base
de l’histoire et des délibérations de la CRPD, et en concluant que
l’article 12 requiert des États membres l’application de la prise de
décision accompagnée.
© 2011 Association ALTER. Publié par Elsevier Masson SAS. Tous
droits réservés.
Introduction
Legal capacity means a ‘person has sufﬁcient knowledge and understanding to reach the threshold
of capacity necessary to commit to a legal contract or take legal action on his or her own behalf’ (Ofﬁce
of the Public Advocate: Carter and Chesterman, 2009). In medical law, legal capacity is not based on
status or age but rather is it a question on ‘capacity. . . that a patient is able to understand what is
involved in the decision to be taken’ (Kennedy and Grubb, 1994). It is measured by assessing an indi-
vidual’s mind to ascertain whether they have the ability to understand a number of factors, including
the nature and purpose of the medical procedure, information about the medical treatment and the
possible effects or consequences of accepting or refusing that treatment (Veith, 2007). Article 12 (Equal
Recognitionbefore the Law)of theUnitedNationsConventionon theRights of PersonswithDisabilities
(CRPD) secures legal capacity as a human right and Clause 12.3 adopts a supported decision-making
model. The Convention does not deﬁne legal capacity, but it suggests that legal capacity refers to rights
such as the right to vote, the right to property and the right to have ﬁnancial control (Parliamentarian
Implementation Handbook, 2008). The disability community pushed for measures to guarantee legal
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capacity, and this is a positive step. Nonetheless, there remain controversial issues concerning legal
capacity, in particular whether substituted or supported decision-making is the best approach to take
in all circumstances. This paper will make an argument for supported decision-making as the best
approach to take.
The CRPD is the ﬁrst legally binding and enforceable international treaty speciﬁcally for persons
with disabilities. Its primary purpose is to ‘promote, protect and ensure that full and equal enjoyment
of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all person with disabilities, and to promote respect
for their inherent dignity’.1 The Convention does not create “new rights” or “entitlements” as it covers
a number of existing rights in a manner that addresses the needs and situation for persons with
disabilities.2 Therefore, theUNcalls forparticipatinggovernments tochange their laws, asnecessary, to
complywith the termsof theConvention in order to protect the right of their citizenswithdisabilities.3
Among these rights, is the right to exercise legal capacity, which was particularly controversial during
the drafting process for the CRPD.
The ﬁnal text of Article 12 of the CRPD states.
Article 12 - Equal recognition before the law
1. States Parties reafﬁrm that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere
as persons before the law.
2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal
basis with others in all aspects of life.
3. States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons with disabilities to
the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity.
4. States Parties shall ensure that all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity provide
for appropriate and effective safeguards to prevent abuse in accordance with international
human rights law. Such safeguards shall ensure that measures relating to the exercise of legal
capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free of conﬂict of interest
and undue inﬂuence, are proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances, apply for
the shortest time possible and are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and
impartial authority or judicial body. The safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which
such measures affect the person’s rights and interests.
5. Subject to the provisions of this article, States Parties shall take all appropriate and effective
measures to ensure the equal right of persons with disabilities to own or inherit property,
to control their own ﬁnancial affairs and to have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and
other forms of ﬁnancial credit, and shall ensure that persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily
deprived of their property.
Although the ﬁnal text of Article 12 was agreed to unanimously, it still remains controversial.
There have been disagreements over the recognition of legal capacity, the recognition of supported
decision-making models and whether Article 12 is open for State Parties to adopt substitute decision-
making models, as in guardianship laws. For example, during the ratiﬁcation process, some States
made declarations and reservations on Article 12, Canada declared, its understanding of Article 12
permits both supported and substituted decision-making arrangements in appropriate circumstances
and in accordance with the law, and further states to the extent that Article 12 may be inter-
preted as requiring the elimination of all substitute decision-making, however, reserves the right to
1 Article 1 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
2 The other rights in the areas such as the right to dignity, employment, the right to live in the community, the right
to exercise legal capacity, the right to access to justice, right to health, education, the rights of children For further
information on the purpose of the Convention, see, UN Department of Public Information, Why a Convention? (2006)
http://www.un.org/disablities/convention/questions.shtml.
3 For further information on the Convention, see the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Some Facts
About Persons with Disabilities, http://www.un.org/disablities/conventionfull/shtml.
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continue to use substitute decision-making in appropriate circumstances (UN Enable–Declarations
and Reservations, Canada).
Theobjectiveof thispaper is to showin termsof thehistoricaldevelopmentofArticle12of theCRPD,
that supported decision-making rather than substitute decision-making is the best interpretation
of Article 12. This will be done by (a) examining the different approaches to legal capacity (status,
outcome and functional approach), (b) looking at the difference between substituted and supported
decision-making, (c) outlining the history of legal capacity (equal recognition before the law) since
1948 in the UN system, and (d) asking what does this history tell us about what legal capacity entails
in decision-making (the gradual shift from substituted to supported decision-making).
The differences between capacity and competence
For the purpose of this paper, it would be better to make a distinction between ‘capacity’ and
‘competence’ so as topromptnoconfusionon itsdeﬁnitionand the rest of thearticle. Capacity connotes
an ability, faculty or power to do or achieve something speciﬁc. In the medico-legal contexts capacity
has been deﬁned as the ability to perform a task ormake decisions (Culver andGert, 1990). The ‘ability’
is to “understand” and “appreciate” the nature and consequences of a decision (Culver andGert, 2004).
From this medico-legal context, capacity relates to some decisions, or act. Typically, capacity4 for
decisions becomes an issue in clinical settings and relates to patients (Owen et al., 2009) and problems
normally arise when a person lacks capacity.5 The proposed legislation in England and Wales deﬁnes
mental incapacity as ‘. . .the inability by reason of mental disability to make a decision on the matter
in question, or to communicate that decision’. On the other hand, the term ‘competence’ is often used
interchangeablywith capacity/incapacity in relation tomental health, but both terms arenot the same.
Competence refers to the legal consequences of not having the mental capacity (WHO, 2005). In these
deﬁnitions, capacity is a health concept and competence is a legal concept (WHO, 2005). Therefore,
capacity refers to individual levels of functioning and competence to their impact on legal and social
standing. For example, due to a serious mental disorder a person may lack mental capacity, and this
may result in being found not competent to make ﬁnancial decisions.
The different approaches to legal capacity
It is important to note the different approaches to legal capacity before turning on to the next
section (distinguishing between substituted vs. supported decision-making) of the paper, so as to give
a clear understanding as to why a supported decision-making model is necessary.
There were two different traditional approaches when the person lacked legal capacity, status
and outcome (Quinn, 2009; Dhanda, 2007; Bellhouse et al., 2001; Wong et al., 1999). The ﬁrst is
the status approach, ‘once it is established that any individual is a person with a disability, the law
resumes a lack of capacity’ (Dhanda, 2007). This status is adequate to strip one’s legal capacity and
place it on someone else to make decisions for the individual (Quinn, 2009), it does not evaluate the
person’s capacity to make a speciﬁc decision (Bellhouse et al., 2001) and the law declares that persons
with either intellectual or physical disability is unable to perform a legal task (Dhanda, 2007). This
traditional status approach has led to a substitute decision-making, depriving an individual of their
human personhood. In England and Wales, the status approach has been rejected in case law (Re C
[Refusal of Treatment] 1994 1 All E.R. 819).
The second traditional approach is the outcome approach, the attribution of incompetence is made
on the basis of the decision arrived at by the person with a disability (Dhanda, 2007). For example, a
4 There is no universal agreed criteria for the recognition of capacity operating across all legal jurisdictions but most systems
do adopt a functional, as distinct from a status, rest in relation to medical treatment. Capacity is assessed in relation to each
decision.
5 According to the Mental Capacity Act (MCA, UK), a person lacks capacity in relation to a particular matter if he/she is unable
to make a decision for himself because of “an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain” (MCA
Section 2 (1)).
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personwith amental disability after voluntarily seeking psychiatric treatment later decides to discon-
tinue it. In such a scenario, the person’s competence is questioned on the decision to terminate their
treatment, whereas to seek treatment in the ﬁrst place is not. This approach has also been declined
in many jurisdictions, for example, in England and Wales (Kennedy and Grubb, 1994; Re MB (1997) 2
FCR 541).
Another approach moving away from the traditional one, known as the ‘functional test’ (Donnelly,
2007; Dhanda, 2007). The fact of having a disability alone does not necessarily lead to incompetence,
instead, the person is considered incapable if, by reason of the disability, he or she is unable to perform
a speciﬁc task (Dhanda, 2007; Bellhouse et al., 2001). In this test, the person’s skills and abilities are
assessed in making a particular decision (Grisso, 1986) For example, a person having the capacity
to make a ﬁnancial decision will not necessarily be determined in the same way or with the same
result in relation to getting married. In this sense, most jurisdictions are moving toward the functional
approach and is often accepted, because it maintains a person’s self-determination and autonomy by
placing limits on a person’s right to theminimumextent necessary (The Irish LawReformCommission,
2006). This sharply contrasts with the ‘all or nothing’ approach to capacity which is perpetuated by
the status approach.
A ﬁnding of incompetence in the traditional legal system has resulted in guardians of person or
property being appointed. The traditional approaches mentioned above was made on the basis that,
once an individual with a disability was labelled incompetent, their legal capacity was taken away and
placed in the hands of others or institutions, a substituted decision-making approach. This system has
led very often to the depersonalization of the disabled individual who no longer is deemed to be a full
and equal citizen in society. Even the functional test allows for substitute decision-making in certain
circumstances, for example in the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (England and Wales).6 The next section
will distinguish the difference between substituted and supported decision-making.
Substituted decision-making versus supported decision-making
Substituted decision-making approach
There are two competing approaches as to how people who have difﬁculties making decisions are
treated: substituted decision-making and supported decision-making. Substituted decision-making
enables a proxy to make decisions on behalf of another person (Suto et al., 2002) who is incapable,
therefore, the concerned individual has no right to make a decision for himself or herself. There are
a number of practical implications as to who qualiﬁes to be a substitute decision-maker. Firstly, the
substitute decision-maker should be a person with the best knowledge of the individual’s speciﬁc
wishes, or of their values and beliefs as they pertain at the time of the decision. Generally, close
relatives are preferred as substitute decision-makers in the belief that they will know the individual
well enough to replicate the decision that the individual would make if she or he were capable. Clearly
the individual may be estranged from his or her spouse, parents, siblings or children, and in these
cases, a friend or perhaps the patient’s social worker or nurse will know the individual’s best wishes
(Lazar et al., 1996). Secondly, the substitute decision-maker’s task is to decide not how they would
want to be treated were they in the individual’s situation, but rather how the individual wanted to
be treated (Lazar et al., 1996). Finally, where there is disagreement who is to make a decision, focus
must be made on questions of what the individual would want to be done or what is the patient’s
‘best interest’ (Lazar et al., 1996). Determining a person’s ‘best interest’ varies across jurisdictions and
usually relates to care and treatment, property and ﬁnancial decisions. However, in some jurisdictions,
for example in England, under the Mental Capacity Act 2007, a ‘best interest checklist’ applies to make
a broad range of everyday decisions (including decisions about what clothes to wear, what to have
for dinner and how to spend the day) in a variety of health and social care settings.7 The appointment
6 For more information on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Seehttp://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/contents).
7 For more information on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, particularly on the Best Interest Checklist, See
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/9/section/4).
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of a substitute decision-maker is usually decided through a court system, in the form of a guardian,
either a person, body or institution. Most jurisdictions have incorporated guardianship laws into their
legal system, and as such the status approach ﬁts well into this model. With such a model in place,
one might think there is little scope for abuse or misuse but this is not necessarily the case as will be
explained further below.
However, there are responses from some countries are in favour of making changes and reforms to
guardianship laws, for example the reform of the German Guardianship Law was established in July
2005.8 In this case, the adult guardian is responsible forpersonal andestatematters includingdecisions
on medical treatment. Germany has ceased the application for full guardianship since 1992. However,
in England and Wales, with the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (enforced in 2007) allows for full or limited
substitute decision-making to decide on medical, welfare and ﬁnancial decisions. Some countries are
not in favour and resist the whole concept of guardianship laws, for example in Sweden has replaced
guardianship with two forms of support (explained further in the next section), therefore Sweden
became a progressive country in abolishing the guardianship laws for persons with disabilities.
There has been growing criticisms over the years that a substitute decision-making approach in
managing individuals (for example persons with intellectual disability) has gone against the funda-
mental freedomandprotectionof all human rights (Bach andKerzner, 2010). There aremanyexamples
of guardianship laws having resulted in social and legal harm. In early 1982, Alan Borovoy challenged
adult guardianship as ‘oneof themost intrusive encroachments that democracy can impose. . . ademo-
cratic society has no business rendering people susceptible to the loss of thismost precious freedomon
the basis of a question-begging deﬁnition and elastic terminology’ (Borovoy, 1982). More recently, the
Mental Disability Advocacy Centre (MDAC) has conducted a number of studies on guardianship laws in
Central and Eastern European countries and concluded that persons under this law, ‘They are subject
to signiﬁcant, arbitrary and autonomic deprivations of their human rights. These include a depriva-
tion of their right to property, to work, to family life, to marry, to vote, to associate freely. . .’(Mental
Disability Advocacy Centre, 2007). Therefore, the transfer of personal right to guardians and personal
representatives has failed to offer protection of the individual which substitute decision-making is
meant to assure.
The following example illustrates this point. The Mental Disability Rights International (MDRI)
working in one of the countries challenged a domestic court over inhuman and degrading treatment
and conditions at aNeuropsychiatric Hospital in Paraguay in 2004 (Sundram, 2006)9. The hospital kept
two adolescent boys naked in solitary conﬁnement in a six-foot cell in a very unhygienic, inhuman
and dangerous condition. It became challenging to commence a legal action for the two boys, as their
parents had abandoned them when admitted which led to the director of the hospital becoming their
legal guardian. In pursuant to sue the hospital on persons being abused, the legal authorisation of the
director was needed and him being the defendant for the case– would be required. As these patients
were placed under total guardianship, their rights of access to court to enforce was prohibited. It
is with such experience in mind many persons with disabilities have identiﬁed that Article 12, legal
capacity is a central issue and the doors opened to envision a completely new approach, the supported
decision-making model.
Supported decision-making approach
Alternative to guardianship arrangements is the supported decision-making model. The concept
of supported decision-making is new in relation to Article 12.3 and is predicated on the basic princi-
ple that all people are autonomous beings who develop and maintain capacity as they engage in the
process of their own decision-making even if at some level support is needed (Dhanda, 2007: 458).
8 In Germany, the new reform guardianship law is based on three guiding principles, necessity (bars appointment if the
person can mange independently or with some support from the social services, self-determination (the guardian has to give
the elder of the person with the disability the possibility to lead a self-determined life, and rights of preservation, meaning the
person has the right to vote and to marry.
9 For more information on this, see (http://www.witness.org/index.php?option=com rightsalert&Itemid=178&task=view&
alert id=22).
N. Devi et al. / ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 5 (2011) 249–264 255
In the supported decision-making paradigm, the individual receives support from a trusted individual,
network of individuals or entity to make personal, ﬁnancial and legal decisions that must be followed
by third parties such as ﬁnancial institutions, business, health professionals, and service providers
(Bach, 2006). Depending on the needs of the individual with a disability, the support person will aid
the individual to understand the relevant issues and information and make decisions based on his
or her own preferences (Bach, 2006). If necessary, the support person interprets and communicates
the individual’s preferences and desires to third parties so that they can be realised (Bach, 2006). Sup-
ported decision-making recognises that “even peoplewho have difﬁcultymaking choices, formulating
decisions and communicating their preferences can make positive choices and decisions that further
their personal development, relationships and participation in their communities” (Bach, 2006). For
example, a personwith a learning disabilitymight receive helpwith reading, or support to focus atten-
tion inmaking a decision. An individualwho has no verbal communicationmay need a support person
who understands his or her preferences and wishes and who can interpret and help implement those
decisions. In theseways the supporting entity canprovide assistance even to thosepersonswith severe
mental impairment (Salzman, 2009). For example, as one family acting as support network explained:
“even with all the tools available, Charlie still cannot express his choices independently. We do not
always know what he wants, decisions are not always perfect, but together we can support him to
make decisions about where he wants to live or what he wants to do” (Inclusion International, People
with Intellectual Disabilities & the Right to Make Decisions). At the same time it is also important to
realise that supported decision-making is not always easily applied to all persons with disabilities as
it depends on a case by case situation, depending on the individual’s health condition.
Some concerns have been raised by individuals who have been introduced to the concept of
supported decision-making, that the support decisions may be too greatly inﬂuenced by the sup-
port person or persons (Salzman, 2009). There have been two criticisms of this approach. Firstly,
no decision-making process is perfect or free from inﬂuences, and everyone seeks assistance with
decisions from others at various points in their lives (Salzman, 2009); secondly, supported decision-
making is likely to get at least as close to the individual’s preferences, wishes and values as opposed
in guardianship (Salzman, 2009).
Examples of supported decision-making models
Supported decision-making models have been developed in other countries as one of the alterna-
tives to the guardianship structure. Canada is one of the leading countries in the legal implementation
of supported decision-makingmodels, for example, the Vulnerable Persons Livingwith aDisability Act
1993 from the province of Manitoba. Another example, as per the British Columbia’s Representation
Agreement Act (RAA), is where an adult can enter into a ‘representation agreement’ with a trusted
person or support service who is empowered to either to assist that individual in making and commu-
nicating certain decisions with which he or she needs assistance, or to make decisions for him or her.
Signiﬁcantly, the individual does not compromise any existing legal capacity by entering into a rep-
resentation agreement, however, it can be questioned whether this type of agreement is a supported
decision-making model as the Act allows for decisions to be make on the person’s behalf, even though
the paradigm created by the RAA is predicated on a relationship of trust and creates a mechanism that
bears some resemblance to a power of attorney.
Another example of supported decision-making model is called ‘legal mentor’ or known as ‘God
Man’ (who acts as the individual’s agent, with the individual’s consent) from Sweden (Herr, 2003).
Sweden has revoked their formal guardianship laws for adults with disabilities in 1989, and replaced
it with this supported decision-making model. The mentor is appointed through the local court pro-
cedure with the consent of the individual needing assistance. The mentor represents the individual in
making an application for special services, supervising ﬁnancial transactions and other legal matters
for support and guidance (Herr, 2003).10 The application service for the appointment of mentors is
10 The individual has legal remedies against the mentor who acts outside of his or her authority or who attempts a transaction
where the person ‘would have been able to give his consent but did not do so’. See A. Everette, The New Sweden Guardianship
Law (1989).
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informal, fast (three weeks) and free for the applicant (Herr, 2003). The mentors can be close rela-
tives of the individual, a person with a disability, friend, social worker or even a lawyer. However, the
recruitment of thementor poses problems as there are not enoughmentors available to accommodate
those needing such a service and the Swedish municipalities do not take active measures to identify
and supply persons needing such appointments (Herr, 2003). A person’s legal capacity is not compro-
mised by the appointment of the ‘legal mentor’ described above under supported decision-making.
At any point, the individual may terminate the mentorship and therefore, the wishes of the individ-
ual are met at every stage of their decision-making. Whereas, with substituted decision-making the
individual does not have a position to compromise, the individual either has capacity or not at all with
this model (this approach can be identiﬁed within the status approach).
Both the substituted and supported decision-making approach has raised some concerns for per-
sons with disabilities. But the supported decision-making approach is more likely to promote and
provide the individual’s self-determination and autonomy, the freedom to choose and live a life
that is preferred –maintaining their personhood. It is also understood from the above that substi-
tute decision-making has been an evolving concept in the legal system for many centuries, misused.
This has led to a supported decision-making approach, a paradigm shift from substituted to supported
decision-making. As Gerald Quinn frames the shift in relation to Article 12, ‘It is frequently said that
Article 12 of the CRPD is emblematic of the paradigm shift of the convention. . . the deceptively sim-
ple proposition that persons with disabilities are ‘subjects’ and not ‘objects. . .’ (Quinn, 2010). It is
also noteworthy to examine this paradigm shift that led to Article 12 from substituted to supported
decision-making within the UN system, after all the CRPD is a contemporary driven international
convention.
The next section will brieﬂy outline the historical development towards Article 12, and examines
whether therehasbeeneither agradualor suddenshift fromsubstituted to supporteddecision-making
since 1948 within the UN legal system. This will follow onto the reasons why a supported decision-
making is the best interpretation of Article 12 and the more appropriate approach to decision-making
with some case examples.
Historical development– is the consensus moving towards supported decision-making?
Equal recognition before the law in the UN Conventions
Since 1948, only a few international conventions have included ‘equal recognition before the law’
applying to all personswith orwithout a disability. This is illustrated in Table 1 by identifying the name
of the international convention (in chronological order since 1948) and its speciﬁc clause in relation
to equal recognition before the law. This dates back to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of
1948 applicable to all persons in the UN system. Gradually, equal recognition before the law begins
to target speciﬁc groups making it not just a human rights document but also a political document,
for example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPRArt.16), Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEFDAW Art. 15(1) and the Convention
on the Protection on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families (MWF Art.24). Therefore,
it could be based on this assumption that a newly created Convention on disabilities had to include
‘equal recognition before the law’ in its document as it speciﬁcally targeted the disability community.
It can be noted that this not the only reasoning behind ‘equal recognition before the law’ in Article 12
will be explained below.
Substituted or supported decision-making in the UN system
Table 2 provides a list of international conventions and declarations that have incorporated either
substituted or supported decision-making since 1948. The Declaration on the Rights of Mentally
Retarded Persons (DRMRP) is the ﬁrst declaration to emphasis the rights of persons with mental
disabilities to develop their full abilities and promote their integration. It is also the ﬁrst declaration
to provide substitute decision-making under Article 5 (Table 2) ‘The mentally retarded person has the
right to a qualiﬁed guardian’ and further states under Article 7 (Table 2) that they can be prohibited
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Table 1
Analogy of International Convention and Declarations in relation to ‘equal recognition before the law’.
International Human Rights
Convention and Declarations
Year Article Text of the Convention in relation to ‘Equal Recognition before
the Law’ (legal capacity)
Applied
Universal Declaration on
Human Rights
1948 Art. 6 ‘Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person
before the law’
All Persons
Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
1965 Para. 3 ‘all human beings are equal before the law’ All Persons
International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights
1966 Art. 16 ‘Everyone shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law’
All Persons
Declaration on the Rights of
Mentally Retarded Persons
1971 Art. 1 ‘The mentally retarded person has, the maximum degree of
feasibility, the same rights as other human beings’
Persons with intellectual
and development disability
Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against
Women
1981 Art.15(1) ‘State Parties shall accord to women equality with men before
the law’
Women
Art.15(2) ‘State Parties shall accord to women, in civil matters, a legal
capacity identical to that of men and the same opportunities to
exercise that capacity. In particular, they shall give women
equal rights to conclude contracts and to administer property
and shall treat them equally in stages. . .’
Convention on the Rights of the
Child
1990 Art. 23 ‘. . .mentally or physically disabled child should enjoy a full
and decent life, in condition which ensure dignity. promote
self-reliance and facilitate the child’s active participation in the
community.’
Children with disabilities
Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and their Families
1990 Art. 24 ‘Every migrant worker and every member of his or her family
shall have the right to recognition everywhere as a person
before the law’
Migrant workers and their
Families
The Principles of Persons with
Mental Illness and the
Improvement of Mental
Health Care
1991 Principle 1(2) ‘all persons with mental health illness, or who are being
treated as such persons shall be treated with humanity and
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’
Mental Illness
Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities
2008 Art.12(1) ‘State Parties reafﬁrm that persons with disabilities have the
right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law’.
Disabilities
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Table 2
Human Rights Convention and Declarations Incorporating ‘Substituted’ or ‘Supported’ Decision-Making.
International Human Rights
Convention and Declarations
Year Article Text of the Convention in relation to decision-making ‘Substituted’ or ‘Supported’ Applied
Declaration on the Rights of
Mentally Retarded Persons
1971 Art. 5 ‘The mentally retarded has the right to a qualiﬁed
guardian when this is required to protect his person
well/being and interests’
Substituted
decision-making
Persons with intellectual
and development disability
Art. 7 ‘Whenever mentally retarded persons are unable,
because of the severity of their handicap, to exercise all
their rights in a meaningful way or it should become
necessary to restrict or deny some or all of these
rights. . .’
World Programme of
Action Concerning
Disabled Persons
1982 E. Rehab. 19 ‘Rehabilitation programmes should make it possible
for disabled persons to take part in designing and
organising the services . . . participation of disabled
persons in the decision-making relating to
rehabilitation . . ..when people such as the severely
mentally disabled may not be able to represent
themselves adequately in decisions affecting their
lives, family members or legally designated agents
should take part in planning and decision-making.’
Substituted
decision-making
Disabilities
F. Equal. 29 ‘Mentally handicapped people are now beginning to
demand a voice of their own and insisting on their
right to take part in decision-making and discussion.
Even those with limited communication skills have
shown themselves able to express their point of view.
Convention on the Rights
of the Child
1990 Art. 12 ‘State Parties shall assure of the child who is capable of
forming his or her won views the right to express
those views freely in all matters affecting the child . . .’
Substituted
decision-making
Children
Art. 14 ‘State Parties shall respect the rights and duties of the
parents and, when applicable, legal guardians, to
provide direction to the child in the exercise of his or
her right in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacitates of the child.’
Principles for the
Protection of Persons
with Mental Illness and
the Improvement of
Mental Health Care
1991 Principle 1 (6) ‘Any decision that, by reason of his or her mental
illness, a person lacks legal capacity, and any decision
that, in consequence of such incapacity, a personal
representative shall be appointed. . ..
Substituted
decision-making
Persons with Mental Illness
Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities
2008 Art. 12(3) ‘States Parties shall take appropriate measures to
provide access by persons with
disabilities to the support they may require in
exercising their legal capacity.’
Supported
decision-making
Disability
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from exercising their legal capacity ‘. . .because of their severity of their handicap, to exercise all their
rights in a meaningful way. . . to restrict or deny some or all of these rights. . .’. This declaration can be
interpreted to point out that a person’s legal capacity is only affectedwhen the person lacks the capac-
ity to make decisions and as an option, a legal guardian can be appointed. The World Programme of
Action Concerning Disabled Persons11 also included the option of having substituted decision-making
under rehabilitation. The Programme (Table 2) suggests thosewith severe disabilitiesmay have family
members or their legal guardian/agent participate in the decision-making process on their behalf. At
the same time the Programmeencourages thosewhoarementally handicapped (under F. Equalisation,
Table 2) should be encouraged to participate themselves in the decision-making process.
The substituted decision-making approach does not only apply to those with severe disabilities
but also for children with or without a disability. The concept of ‘best interest’ was incorporated in
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) in Article 3 stating, ‘the ‘best interest’ of the children
must be the primary concern in making decisions that may affect them. Those who were acting in
the child’s best interest were parents or appointed legal guardians and the States had to respect their
decisions in providing direction to the child. It is understandable that substitute decision-making is
provided to the child, however, it is needless to dismiss that the child also has the right to exercise
legal capacity as stated in Article 12 of the CRC (Table 2).
The concept of using substitute decision-making continued into the 1990s with the establishment
of the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Health Care
in 1991.12 The Principle does not adopt a speciﬁc clause on the right for legal capacity for persons with
mental illness, however, it does state that if a person lacks legal capacity, ‘.in consequences of such
incapacity, a personal representative13 shall be appointed. . .’ (Table 2) by law. Therefore, it can be
concluded that the Principles, though it is permissible to deprive an individual of their legal capacity
due to mental illness, if the person lacks the capacity a personal representative can be appointed to
make decisions on their behalf.
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
Itwas not until the establishment of the CRPD in 2006 (entered into force in 2008) that a ‘supported’
decision-making text was introduced. The question is what led to the sudden shift from substituted
decision-making to supported decision-making, whilst from a historical point of view as most of the
declarations have shown that the UN system has opted for substitute decision-making mechanism.
The next section will look at as to the reasons a ‘supported decision-making’ model was incorporated
in the CRPD.
The deliberation process to formulate the text on Article 12
During the beginning stages of the deliberation process (leading to the CRPD in 2006) in formulat-
ing the text for legal capacity14 (Box 1 - draft text of Article 9), there was a divergence of opinion as
to how the question of either assistance or support should be approached including the question of
legal guardian (Dhanda, 2007).15 The last suggestion of incorporating this form of substitute decision-
making approach (appointing a legal guardian) was directly opposed by some NGOs, particularly
11 The Programme restructured disability policy into three distinct areas: prevention, rehabilitation and equalisation of
opportunities.
12 It is a set of principles to deﬁne the basic rights and fundamental freedoms of persons with disabilities and was considered
a new development in the ﬁeld of treatment of mental health and protecting persons with mental illness.
13 In the Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care (1991),
“personal representative” is deﬁned as ‘a person charged by law with the duty of representing a patient’s interests in any
speciﬁed respect or of exercising speciﬁed rights on the patient’s behalf, and includes the parent or legal guardian of a minor
unless otherwise provided by domestic law’.
14 The ‘Working Group (WG)’ was established by the Ad Hoc Committee whom were asked to formulate the ﬁrst text on legal
capacity to be considered. The WG had the beneﬁt of a number of proposals for elements of the Convention from regional
groups, particularly countries and disabled peoples organisations.
15 For further information on this, see, Asia Paciﬁc Regional EGM, Revised Bangkok Draft.
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Box 1: This is the first text on legal capacity by the Working Group established by the
Ad Hoc Committee.
Draft Article 9: Equal Recognition before the Law
States Parties shall:
a. recognise persons with disabilities as individuals with rights before the law equal to all other
persons;
b. accept that persons with disabilities have full legal capacity on an equal basis as others,32
including in ﬁnancial matters;
c. ensure that where assistance is necessary to exercise that legal capacity:
i. the assistance is proportional to the degree of assistance required by the person concerned
and tailored to their circumstances, and does not interfere with the legal capacity, rights and
freedoms of the person;
ii. relevant decisions are taken only in accordance with a procedure established by law and
with the application of relevant legal safeguards;33
d. ensure that persons with disabilities who experience difﬁculty in asserting their rights, in
understanding information, and in communicating, have access to assistance to understand
information presented to them and to express their decisions, choices and preferences, as well
as to enter into binding agreements or contracts, to sign documents, and act as witnesses;34
Footnotes:
32: The intent of this paragraph is to acknowledge that children are not generally accepted as
having full legal capacity and that neither would, therefore, children with disabilities. In terms of
legal capacity, persons with disabilities should be treated without discrimination on the basis of
disability.
33: Paragraph (c) allows for the provision of assistance to a disabled person to exercise their
legal capacity, and is based on the assumption of full legal capacity, even if the person needs
assistance in exercising that capacity. It is intended that subparagraph (c) (ii) apply only in excep-
tional circumstances, for which legal safeguards must be provided. The Ad Hoc Committee may
wish to consider whether the paragraph is sufﬁciently clear, and also how best to protect persons
with disabilities who cannot exercise their legal capacity. A separate paragraph may be required
for this purpose. Some members of the Working Group
proposed that where others are exercising legal capacity for a person with disabilities, those
decisions should not interfere with the rights and freedoms of the person concerned.
34: The ﬁrst part of paragraph (d) has more general application than the equal recognition
of persons with disabilities as persons before the law and the Ad Hoc Committee may wish to
consider its most appropriate placement in the Convention.
Inclusion International who were heavily involved in the drafting process of the CRPD. This interna-
tional organisation promotes the rights of persons with intellectual disabilities and has a ﬁrm stance
on supported decision-making. For them a supported decision-making means, there is no transfer of
rights to another person, persons with disability fully enjoy all their rights. They had avowed to battle
against any reference to paternalistic guardianship laws in the CRPD, commenting, ‘it is not necessary
any longer to place persons under guardianship by labelling them as being totally incapacitated and
by denying some or all their rights’.16 Another NGO, the World Network of Users and Survivors of
Psychiatry (WNUSP) involved in the deliberation process of the CRPD, emphasised the importance of
the right to autonomy and self-determination by stating that ‘Persons with disabilities have the right
to make their own decisions based on their feelings and values, and not have their decision interfered
with by others . . .’17 arguing further that requiring assistance cannot be the basis of denying a person’s
legal capacity to act. They strongly argue that substituted decision-making for a number of persons do
16 For further commentary from Inclusion International, see U.N. Enable, Working Group, Contribution by Inclusion Interna-
tional (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgcontri-inclintl.htm).
17 Contributions by World Network of Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (WNUSP), for the Working Group, Compilation of
Elements (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/wgcontrib-inclint1-htm).
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not have the wisdom to exercise legal capacity, however, legal capacity is about the freedom to make
choices and not the wisdom of those choices. There should be complete freedom for all human beings
to make mistakes and learn or not learn from it, learning from trial and error.18
When drafting the text on support, it was not as a right for persons with disabilities but as a duty of
State Parties. In regards to thedutyof the State Party, viewswere recommended fromthebelief that the
claimof universal legal capacity could not be extended to all personswith disability. It was pointed out
with this view that there could exist a small number of personswith disabilitieswhowould not be able
to function even with support, and would need others to make decisions on their behalf. If this was a
reality, then the Conventionwould have tomake provisions for substituted decision-making including
safeguards against its misuse. To counter argue for an explicit clause for substituted decision-making
in the Convention, it was pointed out that if ‘support was to be provided proportionally to the actual
needs of the person with the disability, then it would encompass the entire range of support, from the
lowest to the highest level of support’ (Dhanda, 2007). The fact that a person needs high support was
not a reason to surmise absence of capacity. It was noted by the International Disability Caucus (IDC)
that substituted decision-making is premised on the incapacity of a person with a disability and that
guardianship would make all decisions on the person’s behalf with or without consultation. It was
therefore argued by the IDC that the paradigm of supported decision-making, rather than substituted
decision-making, is preferable since it more fully recognizes the right of people with disabilities to
equal treatment and the protection of their human rights. In further defence of the supported decision-
making model, it was argued as the model made for an acknowledgement of human interdependence,
it furthered the human rights of all persons.
Strong disputes were held in the new Working Text of Article 1219 between supported and substi-
tuted decision-making by outlining a small bracket which included a paragraph that allowed for an
appointment of personal representative as a matter of last resort (Working Text, Draft Article 12.2(b)
(Box 2 - draft text of Article 12). Some States requested the deletion of the brackets surrounding
12.2(b) (Box 2 - draft text of Article 12), continuing to reason that guardianship will need to continue
for somepeoplewith higher needs of disability and suggested to carry out the process for guardianship
explicitlymentioned in the Convention.20 In opposition to this view, other States informed that AdHoc
Committee that the Convention was not just only a legal document but also a political document and
therefore, themessageon legal capacity of an excluded community shouldbeunequivocal and forward
looking. For the Convention to make a paradigm shift, it was necessary that the Convention should
express its concern for persons with higher support needs within the supported decision-making
model.21 It was further argued by the IDC that the need for the Convention to make the paradigm
shift, which underscored the fact that while supported decision-making was premised on the compe-
tence of person with disabilities, substitute decision-making was based on their incompetence, and
hence the two concepts could not subsist together.
The Ad Hoc Committee ﬁnally came out with the ﬁnal text on Article 12 during the Eighth Session,
which the IDC pressed for and expressed an unequivocal commitment to the supported decision-
making model in the Convention, while also taking on the concerns of persons with high support
needs. Though the ﬁnal text concluded by incorporating supported decision-making only, Amita
Dhanda states that theﬁnal text doesnotprohibit substitutedecision-makingeven if it is not expressed
explicitly (Dhanda, 2007). And certain countries (Canada and Australia) during the ratiﬁcation process
declared that their understanding of Article 12 is to have both substituted and supported decision-
making. However, my analysis provides a strong justiﬁcation that Article 12 should incorporate only
a supported decision-making paradigm for all the reasons stated above in the paper.
18 For more information on their position, see the Dhanda, Amita “Advocacy Note on Legal Capacity” (World Network of Users
and Survivors of Psychiatry) (www2.ohchr.org/SPdocs/CRPD/.../WNUSP Legal Capacity.doc).
19 UN Enable Working Text – Article 12: Equal Recognition before the Law (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/
ahcstatachtxtart12.htm).
20 Some oft he States that made such a demand were Kenya, Mexico, Serbia and Montenegro (During the Seventh Ad Hoc
Meeting) Notes taken by Dhanda, 2007.
21 Liechtenstein made a strong intervention to this effect during the Seventh Ad Hoc Meeting.
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Box 2: The Working Text for the text of Article 12
Draft Article 12: Equal Recognition before the Law
1. States Parties reafﬁrm that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition everywhere
as persons before the law.
2. States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities have [legal capacity]1 on an
equal basis with others in all ﬁelds and shall ensure that where support is required to exercise
that capacity:
(a) The assistance provided is proportional to the degree of support required and tailored to the
person’s circumstances, that such support does not undermine the legal rights of the person,
respects the will and preferences of the person and is free from conﬂict of interest and undue
inﬂuence. Such support shall be subject to regular and independent review;
(b) WhereStates Parties provide for a procedure,which shall be establishedby law, for the appoint-
ment of personal representation as a matter of last resort, such a law shall provide appropriate
safeguards, including regular review of the appointment of and decisions made by the per-
sonal representative by a competent, impartial and independent tribunal. The appointment
and conduct of the personal representative shall be guided by principles consistent with the
present Convention and international human rights law.
3. States Parties shall take all appropriate and effective measures to ensure the equal right of
persons with disabilities to own or inherit property, to control their own ﬁnancial affairs and to
have equal access to bank loans, mortgages and other forms of ﬁnancial credit, and shall ensure
that persons with disabilities are not arbitrarily deprived of their property.
Table 3
Supported versus substituted decision-making.
Supported model (functional approach) Substitute model (status approach)
Helps persons with disabilities to exercise their legal
capacity (can make decisions for themselves)
Aid the individual to understand relevant issues and
information
Communication
Providing assisted devices
Acts on behalf of the person concerned in terms of their
best interest without seeking the wishes or preferences of
the person
No self–progression (sense of self-helplessness)
Prevention of entering contracts
No civil rights (e.g. no right to vote)
Abolishment of guardianship laws–provides the person
autonomy, dignity and self-determination
Guardianship laws deprive a person of their legal capacity
to act.–led to total incapacitation and depersonalization
Lower risk from abuse and discrimination Higher risk of abuse and discrimination
Competent Incompetent
What the review of this history has shown that the right of ‘equal recognition before the law’ was
incorporated in 1948 as a general right and also targeted speciﬁc groups (women, children andpersons
with disabilities). The review particularly demonstrates that substitute decision-making was the only
approach adoptedbymanyof thedeclarations that dealtwithpersonswithmental disabilities. Though
independent decision-making was encouraged, a legal guardian or representative would always be
opted as a last resort in these laws. Itwas not until the CRPD, that a ‘supported’ decision-makingmodel
was introduced, a complete new approach in dealing with legal capacity. This demonstrates that the
substitute decision-making approach has paved theway for abuse and discrimination for personswith
disabilities and it now has been replaced by supported decision-making. Such a model would hope to
minimise the risk of abuse and discrimination for persons with disabilities. Table 3 brieﬂy in a nutshell
illustrates the differences between the two models and shows that a person can exercise their legal
capacity by having the supported decision-making model.
Conclusion
The CRPD is the ﬁrst legally binding human rights treaty with a comprehensive list of rights for the
protection and promotion of persons with disabilities. Article 12 of the CRPD secures legal capacity,
N. Devi et al. / ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 5 (2011) 249–264 263
possibly the single most deliberated article during the Ad Hoc Committee Sessions in formulating the
text of the CRPD. The international consensus of people with disabilities and experts on disability
rights, as expressed in the CRPD, is that all individuals regardless of disability, are entitled to equal
recognition before the law and have the right to exercise legal capacity, and to receive support to
exercise that capacity, if needed. The supported decision-making paradigm presumes each person’s
capacity and ability. It shifts the focus from a perceived deﬁciency in the individual (incapacity) to
the social responsibility to provide assistance with decision making, limiting the stigmatization and
marginalisation caused by substitute decision-making, e.g. guardianship laws. The CRPDmakes it clear
thatwith regard to the human right to enjoy legal capacity regardless of disability and the related right
to obtain appropriate and necessary support in exercising that legal capacity.
The results indicate that the best interpretation for Article 12 is to secure a supported decision-
making model. However, there are limitations on implementing such a model, as there is a lack of
legislative framework and policy in most jurisdictions as guardianship law and practice continue to
dominate. Other limitations to accommodate the supported decision-making model are, for example,
complexities in designating a support network for persons with all disabilities, and developing and
maintaining support networks including the ﬁnancial costs. In pursuant of this, it is necessary to
provide training and education, for example, training the service providers. Furthermore, it is also
important to consider the ﬁnancial consequences of having a supported decision-making model. As
this is a newly evolving concept, the costs of providing such a service will depend on the resources
and economic wealth of each jurisdiction.
To implement such a supported decision-making model, it is also essential to take into account
the possible risks of abuse of the accompanying, in situations of potential conﬂicts and to control
the support person, and that providers of support do not overrule the will of the individual with
the disability. Therefore, there is a need to implement adequate and proper safeguards that must be
governed as speciﬁed under Article 12.4. In line with Article 12.4, an important principle needs to be
recognised that ‘the safeguards shall be proportional to the degree to which such measures affect the
person’s rights and interests’. This ensures that the safeguards must be higher depending on the level
of a person’s disability, if there is a higher degree of disability or a person needs higher support needs.
It is important to recognise that one of the consequences of a supported decision-making model,
for persons with disabilities have the right to make their own ﬁnancial decisions as recognised in
Article 12.5 of the CRPD. This paragraph stresses that persons with a disability have the right to own
property, to open up a bank account and have access to ﬁnancial credit. As a result of the supported
decision-making model, persons with disabilities are entitled to receive support in managing their
ﬁnancial affairs, and such support must be subject to proper safeguards against abuse. However, as
there are different levels of disability, there might be limitations on how ﬁnancial support might be
supported for a personwith a severe disability, i.e. a personwith severe intellectual impairmentmight
receive support to control their ﬁnancial affairs.
Another important factor to consider is the consequences of a supported decision-making model
in relation to different psychiatric cases. For example, a person who is suicidal resisting support and
someone who is delusional might not grasp and understand the consequences of the support the
individual is receiving. Or in the casewhere a person has been institutionalised for several years is now
in the process of being de-institutionalised andhas to be re-conditioned for them tomake decisions for
themselves, as decisions were made for them everyday. In such a situation, it can be questionable how
a supported decision-making model would work effectively for these different situations in practice.
A possible solution is to provide the necessary training and education to service providers to support
persons in such situations. These are some of the challenges to overcome in the foreseeable future of
having a supported decision-making model.
State Parties who have ratiﬁed the CRPD are under a legal obligation to implement a supported
decision-making model. Although the results show that the best interpretation of Article 12 of the
CRPD is to secure a supported decision-makingmodel, it is quite clear at this stage there is no sufﬁcient
evidence or practice to ascertain how a supported decision-making model can be implemented for
person with all disabilities.
264 N. Devi et al. / ALTER, European Journal of Disability Research 5 (2011) 249–264
References
Bach, M. (2006). Legal capacity personhood and supported decision-making. Canadian Association of Community Living, presen-
tation.
Bach, M., & Kerzner, L. (2010) A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity, Prepared for the Law
Commission of Ontario. Retrieved January 2011, from http://www.lco-cdo.org/disabilities/bach-kerzner.pdf.
Bellhouse, J., Holland, A., Clare, I. & Guinn, M. (2001). Decision-making capacity in adults: its assessment in clinical practice.
Advances in Psychiatric Treatment, 7, 294–301.
Borovoy, A., (1982) Guardianship and Civil Liberties. Health Law Canada, 3, 51-57, cited from Bach, M & Kerzner, L., (2010)
A New Paradigm for Protecting Autonomy and the Right to Legal Capacity, Prepared for the Law Commission of Ontario.
Retrieved January 2011, from http://www.lco-cdo.org/disabilities/bach-kerzner.pdf.
Carter, B., Chesterman, J., (2009). Supported Decision-making, Background and discussion paper. Victoria: Ofﬁce of
the Public Advocate. Retrieved October 2010, from http://www.publicadvocate.vic.gov.au/ﬁle/ﬁle/Research/Discussion/
2009/0909 Supported Decision Making.pdf.
Culver, C. M. & Gert, B. (1990). The inadequacy of incompetence. Milbank Quarterly, 68, 619–643.
Culver, C. M. & Gert, B. (2004). Competence. In J. Radden (Ed.), The Philosophy of psychiatry: A Companion, (pp. 258–270). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Dhanda, A. (2007). Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar fort the Future?
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, 34, 429–462.
Donnelly, M. (2007). Assessing Legal Capacity: Process and the Operation of the Functional Test. Judicial Studies Institute Journal,
2, 141–168.
Grisso, T. (1986). Evaluating competences: forensic assessments and instruments. New York: Plenum.
Herr, S. S. (2003). Self-determination, autonomy, and alternatives for guardianship. In The Human Rights of Persons with Intel-
lectual Disabilities. Oxford: Oxford University Press., pp. 429–450
Kennedy, I., & Grubb, A. (Eds.). (1994). Medical Law: Texts with Materials. London: Butterworths.
Lazar, N. M., Greiner, G. G., Robertson, G. & Singer, P. A. (1996). Bioethics for clinicians: 5. Substitute decision-making. Canadian
Medical Association Journal, 155, 1435–1437.
McLay 2008. See, Mental Disablity Advocay Center (2009), ‘UN Conference of State Parties - Day2 - Legal Capactiy’ (Budapest,
Hungary 2009). (http://mdac.info/content/un-conference-states-parties-day2-legal capacity).
Owen, S. G., Freyenhagen, F., Richardson, G. & Hotopf, M. (2009). Mental capacity and decisional autonomy: an interdisciplinary
challenge. Inquiry, 52(1), 79–107.
Quinn, G., (2009). An Ideas Paper, Seminar on Legal Capacity Consortium on Human Rights and Disability, European Foundation
Centre, Brussels. Retrieved July, from http://www.efc.be/Networking/./Disability/Documents/EFCGQﬁnal.doc.
Quinn, G. (2010). Personhood & Legal Capacity. In Perspectives on the Paradigm Shift of Article 12 CRPD HPOD Conference. Boston:
Harvard Law School.
Salzman, L. (2009). Rethinking guardianship (again) substituted decision-making as a violation for the integration mandate of
Title II of the Americans with Disability Act. University of Colorado Law Review, 81, 157–205.
Sundram, C., (2006). A discussion of legal capacity in the draft convention on disability, National Disability Authority. Mental
Disability Rights International, Dublin Ireland.
Suto, W. M. I., Clare, C. H. & Holland, A. J. (2002). Substitute ﬁnancial decision-making in England and Wales: a study of the Court
of Protection. Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law, 24(1), 37–54.
The Irish Law Reform Commission (2006), Report Vulnerable Adults and the Law.(Ireland, LRC 83-2006).
United Nations, (2008) ‘From Exclusion to Equality, Realising the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ Disabilities, Handbook for
Parliamentarians on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and its Optional Protocol, Geneva.
United Nations, (2010), Enable–Declarations and Reservations, Retrieved June 2010 from http://www.un.org/disablities/
default.asp?id=475.
Veith, K. (2007). The Jurisdiction of Medical Law. United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing Limited.
Wong, J. G., Clare, I. C. H., Gunn, M. J. & Holland, A. J. (1999). Capacity to make health care decisions: its importance in clinical
practice. Psychological Medicine, 29, 437–446.
WorldHealthOrganization. (2005). Resource book on mental health human rights and legislation. Geneva and Switzerland: Library
Cataloguing in Publication Data.
Case law
Re C, (Adult: refusal of treatment) [1994] 1 All ER 819.
Re MB, (An Adult: Medical Treatment) [1997] 2 FCR 541.
